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5. This reduction in the foreign establishments was the cause of the abandonment in whole or in part of various posts along the Peking-Tsien-tsin-Shanhaikuan Rail- way,
which had been garrisoned previously in order to prevent the destruction of the line by the Chinese, should disturbances of a serious nature again arise. But, owing to the reduction of certain posts to the extent of 970 men, the British detachments at Lutai, Tongshan, and Shanhaikuan have become more isolated. They consist of 258 all ranks at Lutai, and of 311 at Tongshan, while there are 477 at Shanbaikuan, but DO one of them would be in a position to support the others in a case of serious disturbance. At Tien-tsin there are 2,700 troops of all nationalities other than Chinese, of which 800 are British; there are 1,100 (569 of them are British) between Tien-tsin and Shanhaikuan, and less than 800 (477 British) at the latter station, the distance from Tien-tsin to Shanhaikuan being 192 miles. In the event of a general distur- bance such as might arise either on the death of the elderly Dowager-Empress, on that of the Viceroy, Yuan-Shi-Kai, or from some other cause, the small posts would be exposed to needless risks, while the force which I have at Tien-tsin would be very meagre indeed for the work to be performed.
6. If, on the other hand, I can concentrate my two Indian battalions at Tien-tsin, with the exception of one company, which I think it important to station at the port of Chingwangtao, I would then have a force sufficient to deal effectively with any trouble at this vice-regal capital at the outset. In fact, it would be one of those cases where a pail of water may, by timely application, extinguish a fire which would otherwise become a general conflagration demanding vastly greater resources. Had I the means at my disposal to effect the concentration which I desire, I would have already carried out the change; but, at present, want of barrack accommodation provides an insuperable obstacle, as there is no accommodation in Tien-tsin of any kind to be bad where I could house another company. For the same reason, I cannot increase the strength of the troops at Lutai, Tongshan, or Shanhaikwan; indeed, matters at the last-mentioned place are such that the four and a-half companies there must be divided into detachments, one of which is separated by a distance of 3 miles from its nearest neighbour.
7. Shanhaikwan has other grave defects. My senior medical officer has protested strongly against the very bad and quite inadequate accommodation for the followers there, and, after personal inspection, I entirely agree with him. Cases of plague have occurred lately in the Chinese city at Shanhaikwan, and the condition of the followers' quarters may predispose to its appearance among the Indian troops or their followers. There is no accommodation available at Shanhaikwan for a regimental schoolroom, although this is a very real necessity, as educational tests are now insisted on in the Indian army before native soldiers can obtain permanent promotion. The pupils attended school in tents until winter set in, but these would be far too cold now, and there is no longer even a shed to be had for the purpose; nor have the troops there, who are very strict Hindoos, a prayer-room; the space is so cramped that the soldiers cannot be more tightly packed.
S. The remedy for this very unsatisfactory and, indeed, hazardous state of affairs which I propose for consideration is that cheap but suitable barracks for ten Indian companies should be erected at Tien-tsin, and rented from the contractors, as is done in the case of the barracks already constructed there. The rent for the first three years would be 3,000 dollars per mensem from the date of completion; for the next three, 2,500 dollars per mensem, or for two years at 2,700 dollars per mensem; at the expira- tion of the sixth year the rent for a further period of three years would be 2,800 dollars per mensem, or for two years a rental of 2,500 dollars. In addition to these amounts the housing of the extra number of British officers would be 10,000 dollars per annum, while the cost of the increased accommodation required for transport and followers would amount to 1,500 dollars annually, besides which it might cost 3,600 dollars a-year to hire accommodation at Chingwangtao for the one company which I propose to station there, as it is an important port for Tien-tsin. The total annual cost, therefore, would be for the first three years 51,150 dollars per annum (about 6,0001. at the present high rate of exchange, which will probably fall later); for a second period of three years, 45,150 dollars (47,550 dollars for two years); and for a third period of three years, 42,750 dollars (45,150 dollars for two years). The General Officer Commanding would have the right to cancel the agreement at the end of the second year of the period upon giving one clear calendar month's notice, and, in addition, paying six months' rent in advance as compensation. He would also have the option, should the agreement be renewed for a second or third period of three years each, of cancelling it at the expira- tion of the second year in either term upon giving one clear calendar month's notice, and, in addition, paying six months' rent in advance as compensation.
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9. I have proposed the erection of new barracks in Tien-tsin for ten Indian companies purely on strategical grounds, after coming to the conclusion, from my own personal observation, that the present system of scattered posts is hazardous. There also remains the fact that I have heard no suggestion in any official quarter in North China that there is any probability whatever of the foreign troops being withdrawn for years to come, while, in business circles, such a suggestion would be very strongly resented. In stating this I should add that I have heard several individuals, who are heartily sympathetic towards China, speak in this sense.
10. There is also another reason in favour of my scheme-namely, the increase in the efficiency of the troops due to concentration as opposed to dispersion. Under existing circumstances the Commanding Officer of a battalion does not have the practice he requires, because he can rarely get his men together during their stay in North China,
11. It now remains for me to put forward my final argument in favour of my proposal, namely, the saving which may be effected in the North China Command, firstly, by the abolition of certain expenditure due to the present dispersion of the troops, and, secondly, by the economies which may properly be carried out in connection with some other Departments in this Command.
12. A yearly sum of 18,818 dollars (2.1927.) would be at once saved, if the forces be concentrated, in connection with Royal Engineer expenditure at Lutai, Tongshan, and Shanhaikwan. In other words, the net annual increase by my scheme, taking the Royal Engineer branch alone into consideration, would be 3,800. for the first period of three years, as compared with the gross increase of 6,000l., and it would be, as already shown, less in subsequent periods.
13. The concentration of the troops would enable me to dispense with the medical staffs at Lutai and Tongshan, which cost altogether 1,6604. per annum, and which could then return to India. I have also come to the conclusion that a senior medical officer is not required as such in the North Sea Command. He costs 8731, annually, aud his duties could with benefit be performed by the senior medical officer in Tien-tsin in addition to his very light regular work. Nor can I find any good reason for maintaining a medical quarter-master, who costs 8907. a-year. By this effecting a total annual saving of 2,9231. in the Medical branch, the public service would suffer in no way.
14. In my opinion, the expenditure on the Intelligence branch of my staff might also be diminished without detriment. The pay and allowances of this branch amount, at present, to 2,7811, annually, and are, I think, out of proportion to the results obtainable. I appreciate very highly indeed the services of Major H. R. Davies, of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who is my Chief Intelligence Officer; and I believe that his assistant, Captain Hilton-Johnson, is likewise a very zealous and efficient officer, although I have not yet seen him, as he is travelling in China. I am very anxious to retain Major Davies as my Intelligence officer, but I confess I am of opinion, considering the amount of information now available, that his branch might be reduced by one officer and one European clerk, while the annual grant of 2501. might be reduced to 150%. annually. These reductions would effect a further yearly saving of 8871. Comparing the expenditure on the General Staff proper of the North China Command, which is 1,2871. a-year (inclusive of 3001. for military training and staff rides), with that of my Intelligence branch, which amounts to 2,8711. annually, it might be thought that reconnaissance work in the North China Command is rated at a higher value than the training of the troops for service. Having served for over ten years as a Military Attaché, and also in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, I think the Intelligence branch work in the North China Command is maintained on too lavish a scale, having regard to any probable military eventualities, especially as the distribution, strength, and training of the Chinese army are studied by the Military Attaché at Peking, and are not chargeable to the expenses of my Command.
15. The concentration of troops, which I propose, would also enable me to effect an annual saving in the Supply and Transport branch of about 2,4007, by abolishing the Tongshan Supply Depôt (say, 2001. per annum), besides which the railway expenditure on men and stores, due to the present system, would, it is estimated, be diminished by about 1,5007. a-year; there would further be an estimated saving of 4001, in fuel and light owing to the evacuation of small quarters, each of which has now to be lighted and heated. A rearrangement of the transport system would effect an annual saving of some 300%
16. Lastly, the abolition of the " garrison" command pay aud of the Treasure Chest officer at Shanhaikwan, consequent on its abandonment as a station, would save another 2001. annually.
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